Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses by Daniel Sullivan
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MONOPSONY POWER IN THE MARKET FOR NURSES
Daniel Sullivan
Working Paper No. 3031




This is a revised version of a paper prepared for a Federal Trade Commission
conference on Empirical Approaches to Market Power.Thanks for helpful
suggestions are owed to the conference participants, especially Daniel Sherman,
the paper's discussant.I have also benefited from discussions with Joseph
Altonji, Orley Ashenfelter, David Card, Ann Minnick, Robert Porter, Robert
Willig, June Werner, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago.This paper is part of NBER's research program in Labor Studies.Any
opinions expressed are those of the author not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3031
July 1989
MONOPSONY POWER IN THE MARKET FOR NURSES
ABSTRACT
Estimates are presented of the inverse elasticity of supply of nursing
services to the individual hospital, a quantity which is a natural measure of
employer market power.The estimates corresponding to employment changes
taking place over one year are quite high (in the neighborhood of 0.79) and
even for changes taking place over three years are substantial (in the
neighborhood of 0.26).The estimates do not significantly differ for hospitals
in major metropolitan areas and do not depend very sensitively on the assumed






The market for hospita' nurses is literally the textbook example of monopsony in the abor
market.' Yet, even for nurses, there is relatively little evidence on the quantitative significance
of employer market power. This paper attempts to add to the understanding of monopsonypower
by presenting estimates of a natural measure of its importance, the inverse elasticity of supply of
nursing services to an individual hospital. The dependence of the elasticity on the length of the
relevant time period, on whether or not the hospital is located in a large metropolitan area and on
the nature of the oligopsony equilibrium characterizing the interactions among hospitals is also
investigated.
A number of policy issues make the market for nurses an important one to study. Indeed, the
hypothesis that the mar1et for nurses is characterized by substanfta employer mar1et power was
first advanced by Donald Yett (1970) as an explanation for 'the chronic shortage of nurses.'2
That is, Yen suggested that George Archibalds (1954) analysis of imperfectly competitive input
markets provided the explanation for the apparent failure of market forces to eliminate the
shortage of nurses. The argument is that owing to imperfect competition, an individual hospital
faces an upward sloping supply curve for nurses, and thus at its optimal level of employment,pays
wages below the relevant marginal product. As a result, the hospital would be willing to hire
additional nurses at its current wage (and so might report vacancies) but would not be willing to
raise that wage to attract more nurses since the benefits would be outweighed by the increase in
wages paid to its existing work force.3 Yett added that these equilibrium vacancies might
represent a misaflocation of resources that would not be corrected by normal market forces and
thus constituted a significant public policy concern.4
More recently, the nursing profession has been at the center of the comparable worth
controversy. Believers in "pay equity reform proposals claim that occupations such as nursing
which are held primarily by women have been paid less than occupations requiring simi'ar levels
of skill and responsibility which are held primarily by men. They apparently attnbute thispay
differential to a taste for discrimination on the part of employers. The existence of a significant
level of monopsony power in the nursing market would provide an alternative explanation for the
existence of such a differential.5
The theoretical case for the importance of hospital monopsony power is, however, far from
clear. For instance, Sherwin Rosen (1970) has noted that the significance ofmonopsony is
nverseIy proportional to the eIasticty of supply and has offered several arguments for why this
elasticity would be high in the nursing market. These include the existence ofa nontrivialcompetitive fringe of non-hospital employers and a arge pool of quaUfied nurseswho move in and
out of the labor market very freely. He also argued that anti-piratingagreements would be
essential to effective collusion, but would be difficult to enforce, againbecause of the high
turnover rates characteristiC of nursing employment.
Yett responded to Rosen's arguments by pointing out that mostmetropoHtan hospital
associations had in place "wage standardization" programs which weretantamount to colusve
agreements.6 However, of at east equal importance to the monopsonyhypothesis, s the
observation that from the nurse's point of view, hospitals exhibit asignificant degree of
dfferentiation. That is, nurses do not necessarily regard the non-wageaspects ojobs with
different employers as being equivalent. Such differentiation couldobviously arise from the
spatial separation of employers, but could also derive from differencesin a multitude of other
hospital characteristics such as the quaty and safety of the work place,the composition of the
caseload or the way nursing tasks are organized.It differentiation of this kind is substantial, then
there could be significant monopsony power, in the sense of an upwardsiopng hospital evel
supp'y curve7, even without highly collusive behavior on the part of hospitals.
The extent of differenUation and thus the strength of monopsony power are likely todepend
heavily on the length of the relevant time period over which any changes wouldtake place.
Specifically, in the short run, the cost to workers of changing jobs is likely to be high enoughthat
relatively few of them would immediately leave their employer f their wage was Cut by asmall
amount. This would be especially true fit was difficult to distinguish a transitoryfrom a
permanent drop in the wage. In the long run, however, if the wage was kept low, moreworkers
would leave and fewer replacements could be recruited. Thus the magnitude of employermarket
power is likely to be lower in the long run than in the short run.Market power may also be lower
in large metropolitan areas where there are more likely to be hospitals which nurseswill
consider close substitutes. The estimates given below of the market power of anindividual hospital
are, accordingly, allowed to depend on these factors and also onassumptions about the nature of the
oligopsonst equibrium.
A number of previous empirical studies of hospital monopsony power have examinedthe
cross-sectional relationship between the wages of nurses and the level of employer concentration.
Most of these studies have conctuded that higher concentration s associated with lower wages.The
earliest study, that of Richard Hurd (1973) found a strongly negative correlationof average
nursing wages with employer concentration in a 1960 cross-section of Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas and also in a cross-section of larger cities covered by the 1966 Bureauof Labor
Statisticsndustry Wage Survey for the hospital industry. Similarly, Charles Link and John
-2 -Landon (1975), using data from a 1 973 survey of their own construction, found a negative
relationship between concentration and the wages of individual hospitals. Similar resultswere
also found by Roger Feldman and Richard Schetfler (1982) in a national sucvey of hospit&s
conducted in 1977 and by Thomas Bruggink, Keith Finan, Eugene Gendel and Jefferey Todd (1985)
for New Jersey Hospitals in the early I 980's. On the other hand, Killard Adamanche and Frank
Sloan (1982) find no evidence of an association between starting wages and concentration in a
1979 survey of hospitals. This last study controls for the largest number covariates and uses
what is arguably the best wage measure, so the results of the literature ought to be considered as,
at best, mixed on the question of the relationship between concentration and wages.'
More recently, James Robinson (1988) has found that in a cross-section of hospitals,
higher levels of concentration are associated with lower employment of nurses and a lower ratio of
the number of the more highly trained Registered Nurses (RNs) to the number of less highly
trained Licensed Practical Nurses (LPN5). These facts can also be considered consistent with the
importance of monopsony power.
There are, however, fundamental difficulties with studies such as the ones described above.
Except, perhaps, in the case where it is equal to zero, there is no structural interpretation for the
key paramater which measures the partial association of the wage or level of employment with
concentration. In particular, such studies do not directly address the question of how far
monopsony actually depresses wages. The approach adopted here is more direct: Estimates are
given of the elasticity of the supply curve facing an individual hospital. Monopsony power can then
be measured by the inverse of this elasticity. As noted below, the inverse elasticity is directly
related to the percentage difference between wages and marginal product and, if marginal product
is constant, to the amount by which wages are lower than they would be under perfect competition.
The assessment of the exient of market power in output markets has, of course, long been
one of the principal concerns of applied research in the field of industrial organization. Lately
some attention has been focused on the development of formal econometric techniques which jointly
estimate the gap between price and marginal cost and the conjectural variations or some other
set of parameters describing the nature of interactions among firms. (See, for example. lwata
(1974), GoIlup and Roberts (1979), Appelbaum (1982), Spiller and Favaro (1984) and
Roberts and Samuelson (1988); Bresnahan (1988) surveys some of this literature.) Application
of these methods would, however, require data on some variable which shifts the supply funclion of
nurses to the individual hospital, data which the current study lacks.
An alternative line of research exemplified by Bresnahan (1 981) and Baker and Bresnahan
(1985, 1988) takes the nature of the equilibrium between the firms as given anduses this
additional information to identify the gap between price and marginal cost. This is the approach
-3 -adopted here. More specifically, estimates of the hospital level inverse elasticity of supply are
presented below under three alternative assumptions about the nature of the market equilibrium:
An employment level setting equilibrium, a wage setting equilibrium and aconsistent conjectural
variations equilibrium. In each case, variation in individual hospitals' caseloadsis used to identify
the supply response. No formal tests of whether any of these threeequilibrium concepts is the
correct one are given. The development of such tests would, of course,be a valuable contribution.
However, as a first step it seems sensible to find out how much outcomescould differ under
alternative models:
The results presented below suggest that hospitals have very substantial monopsony power
in the short run and that even over a longer time horizon may exercisesignificant market power.
Specifically,the inverse elasticity of supply over one year periods is estimated to be 0.79 (with a
standard error of 0.13) and over three year periods to be 0.26 (with a standard error of 0.07).
It is also found that monopsony power is not significantly lower in major metropolitan areas.
Finally, the results do not indicate significant dependence of monopsony power onthe assumed form
of the oligopsony equilibrium.
Section II of this paper reviews the elementary theory of monopsony, describes the
equilibrium concepts which are assumed in the estimation of the hospital level inverseelasticity
of supply and then lays out the econometric strategy used to obtain estimable statistical models
corresponding to the three equilibrium concepts. Section III describes the data and discusses
possible sources of biases in the methods. The results are presented in section IV and conclusions
are discussed in section V.
II. TheoreticaiFramework and Econometric Strategy
This section begins by reviewing the elementary theory of monopsony and discussing the
relevant quantities to be estimated under three alternative assumptions about the oligopsonistic
equilibrium characterising the market for nurses.It concludes with a discussion of the
econometric strategy which yields statistical models which can be estimated with the available
data.
Consider first a monopsonist hospital which faces inverse supply function W(N). That is, in
order to attract N nurses it needs to offer a wage of W(N). For concreteness, suppose thatthe
hospital is required to service the needs of a certain exogenously given level of caseload, c, and
that it does so at minimum cost,It employs nurses and other inputs X which have prices r. Thus
the hospital solves mtn NW(N) + Xrs.t.f(N X)c where f(N, X) is the production
-4 -function connecting inputs N and X to the output c. Suppressing the arguments of functions and





where X is a Lagrange multiplier.(If the caseload variable c and the production function
UN, X) are vector valued, XtN should be interpreted as the inner product of a vector of
LaGrange mutipIiers with the vector of derivatives of UN, X) with respect to N.) Equation (1)
states that the percentage gap between the marginal product and the wage is equal to e, the
inverse elasticity of supply)° Moreover, if XtN is constant then e will also measure the
percentage gap between the equilibrium wage and the wage that would have prevailed had the
hospital been a price taker. Thus 9 is a natural measure of a hospital's monopsony power and it
is this quantity that is estimated below.
Consider now the case of k + 1 hospitals which have to service caseloads
c0, c1 ck and which face interconnected inverse supply functions
W°(N0 , N1 NK) (2)
Wk WKNO, N1,..., NK)
In order to talk meaningfully about the firm level supply function facing
hospital 0, it is necessary to specify the nature of the equilibrium for all the hospitals. Three
possible equilibria are discussed be".
Suppose first that Nash equilibrium in employment levels is the correct notion of




In this case the natural notion of firm level supply takes the employment
levels of other hospitals as fixed and the equation of interest for monopsony power is the first
equation of (2).
On the other hand, if certain regu'arity conditions are satisfied, the supply system can be
re-arranged to yield
= '°(N0,w1 WK),
which gives the wage hospital 0 would have to pay to attract N0 nurses as a function of the wage
rates of the other hospitals. Thus if Nash equilibrium in wage rates correctly describes the




In this case firm level supply can be thought of as taking the other
hospitals wage rates as fixed and the natural equation to estimate is (4), the equation relating the
hospitals wage to its employment level and the wages of other hospitals.
Finally, the notion of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium implies that the
relevant equauon to be estimated is
=R° ( N0 ,C1 ,..., Ck
That is, under this hypothesis, whose implications for the estimation firm level demand
elasticities has been explored by Baker and Bresnahan (1988), the re'evant notion of firm leve!
supply takes the levels of the exogenous variables shifting other firms demands as fixed. This is
motivated by the assumption that the hospita' is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other
employers. If hospital 0 chooses employment level N0, the other hospita's are assumed to solve
their cost minimization problems taking that levei as given. The soluUons to these minimization
problems are a set of reaction functions
c) which express the employment levels of the other hospitals in terms of their
-6 -caseloads andtheemployment level of hospital 0.Hospital 0 is then assumed to take these
reactions into account in solving its own cost minimization problem. Thus the natural notion of
firm level supply for the Stackelberg leader is obtained by substtutirig these reaction functions
into the standard supply equation (2):
W°(N0,r,(N0 ,c1) NK(N0 ,CK) )
R° (N0 , c , , C<




and (6) is the natural equation to estimate.
Baker and Bresnahan (1988) note that the con&stent conjectures assumption in an output
market is satisfied under several well known sets of assumptions. There are an analogous set of
circumstances in the case of an input market. For instance, a dominant hospital with a
competitive fringe of other employers will act as a Stackelberg leader. Similarly a constant
employment share cartel would have the consistent conjectures properly. Baker and Bresnahan
also note that when product (or in this case, job) differentiation becomes extreme, questions of
strategic interaction become unimportant as all notions of equilibrium converge.'2
Baker and Bresnahan (1 988) settle on extreme product differentiation as their
justification for using the consistent conjectures approach to analyze the market power of firms
in the beer industry, but do not consider other assumptions.If differentiation is, indeed, very
extensive, then the three measures proposed above should be close. This provides a check on
their assumption.
The three notions of oligopsonistic equilibnum each imply an econometric specification
for the inverse supply function giving the hospitals wage rate as a function of its employment
level. The specifications differ only in which additional variables they imply should be included.
For the employment level setting equilibrium, the employment levels of other firms need to be
held constant. For the wage rate setting equilibrium, the wage rates of other firms need to be
held constant. Finally for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium, it is the levels of
the exogenous variables effecting other firms demand for nurses which need to be held constant.
In each case, the hospitars own caseload is the excluded exogenous variable that accounts for the
-7 -endogeneity of the hospitals level of employment and identifies the firm level inverse elasticity
of supply.13
The available data'consist of the levels of nursing wages and employment and measures
of the caseload for a large class of hospitals over a small number of years. Thus in order to
produce estimable versions of equations (2), (4) and (6), it is necessary to make some strong
simplifying assumptions. The strategy employed here has two components. First it is assumed
that the hospitals can be divided nto a number of distinct regional markets and that interactions
between hospit&s in different regions can be ignored. Secondly, it is assumed that there s a high
degree of symmetry in the relationship between hospitals in the same region.
Let Writrit and Crit 1,kr,denote the natural logarithms of the nursing
wage, the number of nurses employed and the caseload (possibly a vector of caseload varabIes)
for the ith hospital in region r n year t. Then a linear in logs approximation to equation (2) for
hospitals n region r would take the form
IWrlt ri + &rt





where a region specific time trend, &nt, has been included in the model as empirical
investigation found to be appropriate. Obviously, with only six years of data and a large number
of hospitals, it is not possible to estimate all the parameters in the above specification.In order
to get an estimable equation, itis assumed that enje for all rand i and that for
a(l n,I and j. With these symmetry assumptions the system of equations (9) becomes a sngIe
equation that can be estimated by pooling across hospitals'5
-8 -Writri &rte n1°'ritgrit
where °'rt =Zj*i rrjt .In this specification, the are a set of hospital specific fixed
effects. These control for unobserved differences in hospitals which are constant through time.
For instance, the location of the hospital relative to population centers and other hospitals, the
safety and other characteristics of the neighborhood, the style of nursing practice, whether the
hospital is associated with a medical school or nursing school, and a number of other factors
affecting a nurse's perception of the desirability of a job at a given hospital can be assumed to be
approximately constant over the six year period of this study.
The hospital effects can be removed by differencing:
dWrt &r$ dnrit d rt
where d Writ=Writ- Wr — d and similarly for the other variables. In the empirical
work described below, estimates of equation (11) are presented differences of d = 1, 2 and 3
years. By looking at the association of wage changes and employment changes over different
engths of time, the dynamic nature of hospital level supply can be investigated. The estimates
show the length of the relevant time interval (one, two, or three years) to be an important
determinate of the strength of monopsony power (the inverse elasticity of supply).
It is worth noting that equation (11) requires at least two years of differenced data for
estimation.'The reason is that nr t+ (on)r t Z t-t does not vary within hospitals in
the same region and so would be confounded with &r if only a single year was used in estimation.
Simsiarly, a specification which adds region specific year effects to equation (11) is not
identified, no matter how many years of data are employed.17 This is the analogue in the
cross-section dimension of the problem of estimating the effects of non-time-varying variables
in panel data studied by Hausman and Taylor (1981). Fortunately, for the purposes of this
paper, there does not seem to be any reason not to use the time series variation in the data to
estimate the firm level inverse supply.
The region specic intercepts in the differenced equation (corresponding to region specific
time trends in the levels specification) can be removed by subtracting region specific means of
the variables: -
-9 -Writ — d 'nt — + ((OF1) — d(0F1)r.)
+ dnit (2)
wherer.. is the mean over time and hospitals in region r ofWr t and simUarly for the
other variables. Equation (12)is estimated by two stage east squares using
(Cnit — and ((oc)rit — d(0r) as instrumental variab'es, where
(0 C)rjis the sum over hospitals other than hospital iin region r in year t of Cr1 t
Similar assumptions are used to arrive at estimable versions of equations (4) and (6).
Specificafly, estimates under the hypothesis of a wage rate setting equiIbrium were obtained by
estim ating
Writ — dWr e (nnjt — + (0W)1 — d0W)r)
+ — (13)
using d Crit — E-) and ( (oc)rit — d(0C)r) as instrumental variables. In
model (13), (OW)rjis the average wage of hospitals other than hosptaI in region rn year
and the other variables are as above.
Similarly, estimates of moriopsony power under the consistent conjectures hypothesis,
were obtained by estmatng
Writ — =9 (
— + ((0C) — dcoc)r)
+ drtt
again using (d Crit — and (d(oc)rit — d°r) as instrumental variables.
Finally, note that, in genera', two stage least squares estimates of structural equations
such as (12), (13) and (14) depend on the normaHzation adopted (that is, on whetherthey are
solved for the change in employment or the change in wages). However, when caseload, c, is a
scalar, all of the above are just-identified and thus elasticity estimates do not depend on the
normalization. In the empirical work presented below, estimates are given for the case where c
-10 -is a scalar and also for a case where it has two components. Even in the case where c is a vector,
equation (14) is just-identified and thus insensitive to the normalization. Moreover, it turns
out that empirically the second component of c does not explain a great deal of the variation in the
change in the wage and thus even the elasticity estimates based on (12) and (13) are basically
insensitive to whether wage changes or employment changes are used as the right hand side
variable. The normalization adopted above, that with the change in the wage on the left hand side,
is the most convenient, since it makes the summary measure of monopsony power a parameter
which is directly estimated.
Ill. Data
The econometric plan outlined above requires data on the wages, employment levels, and
caseloads of hospitals. In the present study, all of these variables are derived from the American
Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Surveys of Hospitals (1979.1985). The Annual Survey is
sent in October of each year to virtually all U.S. hospitals. The data elicited includes information
on the number of full and part time workers in a number of job classifications including
registered nurses (RN5) and licensed practical nurses (LPN5), data on payroll expenses by
category of workers, and data on the size and breakdown of the hospital's caseload. For such an
extensive survey, it has a relatively high response rate (50% or greater depending on the
question). The AHA also estimates the values of a number of variables when a hospital fails to
respond.
Unfortunately, however, the Annual Survey Data are not without problems. First,
hospitals are only asked to report their total payroll expenses for full time RN5 and LPN5
combined. Thus the wage measure that can be constructed is actually for the combined RN and
LPN category. Secondly, the hospitals report the cumulative total of their caseload and payroll
expenses over the previous year, while the employment figures are for the date of the survey.In
order to deal with the first problem, the variable, full time nurses', was calculated as the
number of full time RN's plus 0.765 times the number of full time LPN's) In order to deal
with with the second problem, the final employment level variable was taken to be the time
average of the number full time nurses over the previous year under the assumption of
exponential growth between the two survey dates.2° The wage variable used below was then
calculated as total payroll expenses for full time RN's and LPN's, plus a proportionate share of
the hospital's expenses for benefits, all divided by the employment variable. The wage variable
11was then converted to constant 1985 dollars using theNational Consumer PriceIndex.
Two caseload variables are emp'oyed in the analysis below: Totat inpatient days (the total
number of days spent in the hospital by inpatients during the previous year) and length of stay
(tota' inpatient days divided by tota' admissions). In this data and with the number of npatient
days held constant, the latter is best thought of as a proxy variablefor the ease of treating the
hospitals particular mix of patients. That is, hospitals with longer averagelength of stay
gerieraUy treat a less acute mix of patients.
Tabte I displays the variation in the aggregate leveis of the fourvariables over the time
period of the data used in this study. The top panel is for air hospitalsin the 50 states and the
District of Columbia. The midd'e panel is limited to general hospitals,which for the purposes of
this study are defined to be those hospitals which responded that themajority of their admissions
were for general medical and surgical services (either for patientsof all ages or for children)
and which for every year of available data had an average length of stay ofless than 14 days. The
bottom pane' s for the col$ection of hospitais which are used in the estimationof the inverse
eiasticties described below. For a given year, these are the general hospitals for which alt the
relevant data was supplied by the hospital (rather than estimated by the AHA orimputed as
described below). Also e!iminated were a small number of hospitals which had veryunlikely
values for the wage measure or for the ratio of nurses to inpatient days.2The AHA estimates the
values o each ot the four variables whenever a hospitai does not supp'y them itself.These
estimated values are ncIuded in the totals shown in the top two panels of Table 1Also included
are some values which were imputed for the purpcsesof this study. The irnputatons are
described in the appendix.
Tab'e 1 shows that over the nitial years of the period under study, nursing employment at
hosptals was growing fairly rapidly. but began to decline in 1984 and 1985. Nursing wages,
however, exhibited substantiai rea' growth over the whole period, with especiaIy impressive
gains in 1982. Total inpatient days at hospitals were, on the other hand, falling over thewhole
period with especially sharp drops after the prospective payment system went intoeffect for
Medicare patients in 1983. A little less than half of the drop in Thpatent days is attributab'e to
the drop in length of stay which was also continuous over the period. The differencebetween the
employment and total inpatient days measures in the last two panels of Table 1 reflects thedrop
in response rate to the AHA survey which occurred in the second half of the time periodunder
study. The average wage earnings and average length of stay variables for theestimation sample
continued to closely track the levels for all general hospitals, however.
Table 2 displays some univariate statistics on the estimation sample for 1983. The
distributions for number of nurses and total inpatient days are skewed heavily to the right.
-12 -(This motivates using the logs of the variables since the distributions of these variables are
relatively symmetric.) Note that somewhat over 80% of the total lull time nurses figure is
actually accounted for by full time RNs. Thus the problem due to mixing of RN's and LPNs may
not be overly severe. Table 2 a'so shows univariate statistics on the changes in the four
variables for hospita)s which were in both the 1980 and 1985 estimation samples. As was the
case for the aggregate figures, inpatient days and length of stay tended to decline substantially
while nursing employment tended to rise a moderate amount and real nursing wages tended to
rise substantially. However, the distributions of the changes exhibit a considerable amount of
variablility, with many hospitals moving in directions opposite from the general trends.
Table 3 displays some additional univariate statistics on the hospitals which were in the
1983 estimation sample and which also responded to the AHAs 1983 Hospital Nursing Personnel
Survey. The latter was sent in April of 1983 to a random sample of roughly 20% of U.S.
Hospitals.22 The data on employment levels match reasonably closely those from the AHA Annual
Survey. The Nursing Personnel Survey also contains data on starting sa'aries and average
expense per man-hour exclusively for RN's. Adjusting for inflation, and making standard
assumptions about the number of hours worked per year and the ratio of benefits to wages, the
expense per man-hour figures from the nursing personnel survey are perhaps 5% too low
relative to those from the Annual Survey.It is interesting to note the very smafi premiums paid
for degrees requiring more years of schooling.23 The table also shows that per RN recruitment
and orientation costs are substantial.
Though 1983 was not considered a year in which the nursing shortage was particularly
severe, more than 28% of the hospitals responding reported that they were experiencing a
shortage of RNs.24 21% of the hospitals indicated that they were making use of RNs from
temporary agencies. Unionization, a factor which is not considered in this study, amounts to just
under 15% of hospitals responding to the question. A negligible fraction of hospitals reported
some form of organized job action. Table 3 also shows the breakdown of RN educational training.
Diploma nurses remain the largest category, followed by associate nurses. Baccalaureate nurses
still make up only a fifth of hospital nurses. Substantial numbers of nurses have only a few
years of experience on their current job with offly 40% having greater than five years of
tenure. Even in a year in which the nursing shortage was not considered severe, the table
indicates that over 9% of budgeted positions for RN's were unfilled. The table also shows that
over the previous quarter, 5.5% of nurses were newly hired and 4.3% were separated from the
average hospital. Finally, those hospitaI which used nurses from temporary agencies, used
substantial numbers of them, with the mean ralia of temporaries to full time nurses being
13slightly over 0.25.
Before proceeding to examine the actual estimates of monopsony power, it is worth noting
a few things about the direcUon of certain possible biases.First, as in the estimation of any
inverse supply elasticity, the presence of a demand relation (in this case a first order condition
for the firm, rather, than a standard demand function) gives rise to a negative bias in east
squares estimates: When tthe error term on the inverse supply function is higher than
average, hospitals wifi tend to substitute away from the use of nurses and hence there wiU be a
negative correlation of EntwitFi nritTo the extent that the caseload varables may not be
completely exogenous, this bias may also persist in the instrumental varab!es estimates given
b&ow.
Since the wage variable is calculated by dividing total wage payments by the measure of the
employment lev& used on the right hand side of the inverse supply equations, any measurement
error in the employment level will induce another negative bias to the estimates of the inverse
elasticity, 9. The instrumental variables procedure should remove this bias if the measurement
error in dri (and d'ri t)uncorrelated with changes in the caseJoad.
Finally, there is a potentially impcrtant bias introduced by the use of average wage evels.
That is, when a hospital gets a shock to its caseload that forces it to hire more nurses, the new
workers will probably have ess experience than the average member of the nursing staff. Thus
as employment levels rise in response to increased caseload, the average level of experience will
tend to go down. Thus when an upward sloping supply function forces the hospital to raise the
scale of wages for every lev& of experience, the average wage may not rise by as much as the
increase n the scale of wages.
The data from the Nursing Personn& Survey allow some of these possible biases to be
investigated. In particu'ar Table 4 indicates that issues of measurement error may be of
substantial importance.Thetable displays the correlation matrix for the employment and wage
measures used in the study (which as previously noted were derived from the Annual Survey
data) and the employment level and starting baccalaureate salary measures from the special
Nursing Personnel Survey.25 For the two measures of the employment level, the correlation,
0.983, is quite high. However, the correlation between the two measures of wages is only
0.288, which indicates substantial measurement error.2 Also of note in Table 4 is the fact that
whUe the wage and employment levels from the nursing survey are quite highly positively
correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.41 6), the correIaton between the wage and
-14employment measures from the Annual Survey data is very weak and not statistically significant.
The lower correlation in the Annual Survey data is apparentlt due to a combination of a higher
noise levelin the wage measure and the 'division bias' which, as was noted above, is a
consequence of having a wage measure which is calculated by dividing wage payments by the
employment measure.
Table 5 examines the correlation of the discrepancy between the two employment
measures and changes in the two caseload variables27 The dependent variable in the regression
models is the log of the Annuaf Survey employment level minus the log of the Nursing Personnel
Survey emp'oyment level The results indicate that when total inpatient days increases, the
Annual Survey employment level tends to rise a small amount relative to the Nursing Personnel
Survey figure. None of the estimated coefficients shown in the table are, however, statistically
different than zero. Moreover, since the Nursing Personnel Survey was administered in the
middle of the period covered by the 1983 Annual Survey data used to calculate the changes in
caseload and the emptoyment level, a small positive effect is probably to be expected even if
measurement error in the employment level is completely unrelated to caseload.
Table 6 displays the equivatent statistics for the correlation of the discrepancy in the wage
figures and changes in caseload. The results are more disturbing than those for employment
levels. The point estimates of the regression coefficients are negative and relatively large in
absolute value. Though the standard errors are also large enough that the estimates are not for
the most part statistically significant, the results in Table 6 are certainly suggestive of the
importance of a negative bias imparted to the monopsony power estimates by the use of average
wages.
Table 7 looks directly at how a number of characteristics of the work force of nurses,
including tenure on the job and the distribution of type of degree, change as the level of caseload
changes. Specifically, the table shows the coefficients of the change in caseload from 1983 to
1985 in a number of regression models in which the dependent variable is the corresponding
change in some measure of a characteristic of the work force of nurses taken from the Nursing
Personnel Surveys. The percentage of nurses in the two lowest tenure categories evidently
increases and the percentage of nurses in the two highest tenure categories decreases when total
inpatient days increases. The coefficient on the change in log inpatient days in the model for the
overall tenure index is roughly equal to the standard deviation of the tenure index, so a rough
tripling in the caseload would lead to a one standard deviation drop in the tenure index. The
average years of education also drop as the number of inpatient days increases. A rough tripling
of the caseload would decrease the average years of education by roughly two thirds of a standard
-15 -deviation. The effects of changes in caseload on both tenure2' and education workin the direction
which suggests that using average wages instead of a measure of the scaleof wages mparts a
negative bias in the inverse supply elasticity estimates. Finally, the tableshows that the
vacancy ratio tends to increase as thecaseload ncreases while there are only small effects on the
part time ratio and the ratios of new hires andseparations to fuJi time RN's.
IV. Results
Before considering the estimates of the structural hospital evel nversesupply functions
(12), (13) and (14), it is illuminating to first examine the reduced formreiationship between
nursing employment and wages and the caseload of hospitals. Table 8shows the nature of this
relationship for the levels of the these variables in the 1983 cross-section. As canbeseen,
when the only caseload variable used in the regression is the totalnumber of inpatient days, a
basically constant returns to scale relationship is found, with the coefficient on 09caseload in
the model for log employment having a coefficient just slightlylarger than one. On the other
hand, in the cross-section, wages are only very weak!y related to hospitalsize, as the coefficient
of the log of inpatient days in the model for the log wage is just slightlygreater than zero. When
the log of length of stay is added to the regression model for log employment,its coefficient is
-0.62 (with a standard error of 0.03) which supports the interpretation oflength of stay as an
inverse proxy for the relative severity of the hospitals caseload. Includingthis variable also
causes the coefficient on total inpatient days to rise to 1.12, sothat with this specification there
is a long-run decreasing returns to scale" relationship between output andnursing inputs.
Adding the log of the length of stay to the wage equation has, on the other hand, noeffect.
Table 9 shows the reduced form estimates for the change in the log of employment using
one, two, and three year differences. Estimates are givenfor the full estimation sampIe2 and
also for subsamples consisting of those hospitals which are and are notlocated in metropolitan
areas with a half million or more population. Theindependent variables are the change in the
logs of the hospitals inpatient days and average length of stay andthe change in the logs of the
those variables for other hospitals in the same Hill Burton Service Area(HSA).3° The estimates
of the standard errors are consistent for the case of arbitrary forms ofheteroscedasticity and/or
serial correlation.3 1
The results show the same "short-run increasing returns to scale phenomenon that Hall
(1988) has interpreted as evidence of a departure of price from marginal cost in U.S. Industry.
-16 -The coefficient on the change in the tog of inpatient days, increases from 0236 (standard error
0015) in the equation estimated using one year differences and all the hospitals as longer time
periods are used to difference the data, but even for three year differences, the coefficient is still
only 0.422 (with a standard error of (0.023). The coefficient on the change in the log of other
hospitals' patient days, which theory would predict should be zero or negative is actually
positive for one year differences.It is essentially zero, however, in the equations estimated
using two and three year differences.
The change in the log of length of stay is estimated to have a negative coefficient in all
specifications. Including this variable also raises somewhat the coefficient on the log of inpatient
days. The major difference between the estimates obtained from the major metropolitan areas
and the rest of the country is that the coefficient on the change in the log of inpatient days is
somewhat larger for the former. That is, the increasing returns phenomenon is not as strong in
major metropolitan areas.
Table 10 shows the reduced form equations for the change in the log of the hospital's wage.
The most important result is that, even controlling for movements in the caseloads of
surrounding hospitals, an increase in the caseload of a hospital causes it to raise its wage. For
one year differences, only inpatient days included and all hospitals, the elasticity is 0.187 (with
a standard error of (0.024). This declines to 0.124 (with a standard error of 0.025) for three
year differences. Including the length of stay variables, causes only minor changes. Perhaps
somewhat surprising is that the elasticity of the wage with respect to a hospital's own caseload is
higher in major metropolitan areas than outside those areas. However, Table 9 showed that these
hospitals increased their nursing staffs more rapidly in response to changes in caseload and thus
may have to raise the wage more even if they face a lower firm level inverse elasticity of supply.
Tables 11, 12, and 13, display the estimates of the hospital level inverse supply functions
for, respectively, the employment level setting equilibrium, the wage setting equilibrium and
the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium. Columns one, three and five of the tables give
the estimates using only the change in the log of inpatient days and the change in the log of other
hospitals' inpatient days as instruments. Columns two, four and six add the change in the log of
length of stay and the change in the log of other hospitals' length of stay to the list of
instruments.Z
The estimates of the hospital level inverse elasticity are approximately the same for all
three oligopsony equilibrium hypotheses. That is, for one year differences, only inpatient days
variables in the instrument list and all hospitals included, the inverse elasticity is estimated to
be 0.79 (with standard errors ranging from 0.13 to 0.14). Thus in the short run, the estimates
suggest that hospitals have a great deal of monopsony power. The estimates of monopsony power
17 -decline as the period of time over which the changes take place increases. For three year
changes. only inpatient days variables in the instrument list and aU hospitals included, the
inverse elasticity is estimated to be 0.26 to 0.27 (with standard errors of approximately 0.07).
Thus even for three year changes, the level of monopsony power is estimated to be quite
significant.
It is also interesting to note that in the shortest run, the hypothesis that the variables
summarizing the behavior of other hospitals have coefficients of zero in the hospital level
inverse supply function cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. However, as the
length of the time period over which the changes occur increases, these variables make their
effects felt. For instance, in the wage level setting estimates, using only inpatient days variables
and aU hospitals, the coefficient on the average of other hospitals' wages goes from 0.11 (with a
standard error of 0.24) for one year differences, to 0.77 (with a standard error of 0.16) for
two year differences to 0.94 (with a standard error of 0.19) for three year differences.
Including the length of stay variables as instruments decreases the estimated inverse
elasticities by a few percent, with the effect most noticeable in the wage setting estimates. The
estimated monopsony power is lower by only a small amount in metropolitan areas with
population over a half miHion when one and two year differences are considered. With three
year differences, the two sets of hospitals are estimated to have about the same amount of
monopsony power.
V. Conclusion
The estimates presented above of the inverse elasticity of supply to the individual hospita'
are strikingly high. This is obviously especiaHy true of the estimate of 0.79 for one year
changes, but even the estimate of 0.26 for changes taking place over three years, is quite
substantial. Since, the dynamics of the response are evdentty so important, it is not
appropriate to interpret any of the estimated inverse elasticities as percentage markdowns as
implied by the static theory in equations (3), (5) and (8). However, even if the inverse
elasticity over longer periods of time was somewhat lower than that found above for three year
changes, a reasonable conjecture wou'd be that a cost minimizing hospital would find it in its
interest to pay wages considerably below its nurses' marginal product.
An equally striking result is that the hospital level inverse elasticity is not much lower in
major metropolitan areas, Indeed, given the way that judgements of r&ative market power are
usually formed. this may be the least intuitively plausible result of the study. One possible
-18 -explanation for this result is offered below, but it may simply be that the factors usually thought
of as determining employer market power are not the relevant ones or even that monopsony
power is pervasive in this kind of labor market.
As noted in section III, there are a number of biases which can be expected to cause the
monopsony power estimates to be too low. Thus it is somewhat remarkable that they come out so
high. On the other hand, it is not hard to point to a potential source of upward bias in the
estimates. That is, though a considerable amount of effort went into making them at least
reasonable proxies, the vanables used to controL for the behavior of other hospitals would have
to be characterized as relatively crude. The inverse relationship between the significance of
these variables and the size of the inverse elasticity, suggests that improvements in controlling
for the behavior of other hospitals may reduce the estimates of monopsony power.
The relation of the current results to the "short-run increasing returns" phenomenon is
also worth noting.If a constant returns relationship had been estimated and the findings for the
reduced form for the wage equation been unchanged, the monopsony power estimates for one year
differences would have been about one fourth as large and for three year differences about one
half as large. One exp'anation for the low coefficients seen in Table 9 is error in the measures of
caseload. The measurement error could come from actual recording errors, or, as Zvi GrilIches
and Jerry Hausman (1986) note, cou'd come from using the actual change in output when, in
fact, the correct variable would be the change in output expected at some earlier time when
decisions on emp'oyment levels were actually made. Measurement error may, indeed, explain a
substantial portion of the increasing returns puzzle, but it would not necessarily effect the
conclusions about the extent of monopsony power since, presumab'y, the estimate of the
coefficient of caseload in the reduced form equation for the change in the wage would be effected
by the measurement error in the same way the as in the equation for the change in emp'oyment.
It should also be noted that the theoretical framework of this study ignores a number of
possibly important real world phenomena. Perhaps the most important omission is that of the
labor union. Though the resuits of the Survey of Nursing Personnel indicate that unionization is
still fairly uncommon, its extent is by no means trivial Exactly what value of the estimated
inverse supply should be expected when hospitals are unionized is not entirely clear since, under
the usual assumptions, a well defined supply curve does not exist for effectively unionized
workers.33 However, if a monopoly union considers the wage rate to be a normal good, then an
increase in caseload is ikely to translate into an increase in the wage even if the hospital treats
the wage as exogenous. Thus the market power estimates given above may be exaggerated because
of the presence of unions. Unfortunately, except for those responding to the personnel survey, it
is not known exactly which hospitals are unionized. However, since it is known that unionization
-19 -is concentrated in the major metropolitan areas, this may at least partially explain why the
differences between these areas and the rest of the country appear to be so hard to detect.
Another rea' world complication that is ignored in this paper is the fact that many
hospitals are parts of multi-hospital systems which presumably set wages in consultation with
each other. The cooperative behavior of some hospitals may invalidate the assumption of
statistical independence, but should not have a first order effect on the estimates of the hosptaI
level elasticity of supply which depends on the behavior of nurses rather than hospitals (except
to the extent that hospitals may be choosing a point on a supply function with non-constant
elasticity). However, none of the three oligopsony equilibria described in section II of this paper
will be strictly correct. Thus it would be innapropriate to interpret any of the firm level
eiastctes as a markdown of the wage under the marginal product for the hospitals which
cooperate.
A final complication is that, as was seen above, many hospitals make substantiat use of
nurses from temporary agencies. The existence of temporary agencies may explain part o the
increasing returns to scale phenomenon captured in Table 9. Specifically, hospitals can
partially respond to increased caseload by hiring temporary rather than permanent nurses.
Such a strategy will be particularly advantageous when, as seems to be the case, the short run
supply curve of permanent nurses rises substantially more quickly in the short run than in the
long run. However, as long as the elasticity estimates presented above are interpreted as
estimates of the elasticity of regu'ar permanent-employee nurses, the existence of temporary
nurses causes no problem with the estimates. The temporary nurses are simply another input
used by hospitals.
If the estimates presented above are rehabla, then hospitals have, at least in the short
run, a substantial degree of monopsony power. Since the extent of this power is not much less in
major metropolitan areas. one policy implication of this study would be that the antitrust
enforcement authorities might want to reconsider their rather tolerant attitude towards
attempted coNusion by hospital administrators. With regard to the comparable worth
controversy, the estimates do suggest that wages of nurses may be depressed because of
monopsony power, but given that the estimates do not differ in the expected way between
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas and that no comparable estimates of the monopsony
power possessed by other classes of employers are avaliable, it would be premature to claim that
monopsony explains any of the results obtained by "pay equity" researchers.
Finally, there are also some implications for the methodology of evaluating market power.
Ffrst, at least in this example, the type of equilibrium assumed to characterize the interactions
of the firms makes very little difference to the estimated levels of market power. On the other
20hand, this study should also make it clear that alternative forms of the Baker and Bresnahan
(1985, 1988) methodology can be easily implemented. Secondly, this study has shown that the
dynamics of market power may be very important and specifically that short run and long run
market power may differ substantially. Thus a natural topic for future research would be the
dev&opment of truly dynamic specifications of firm level inverse supply and demand.34
Appendix. Imputation.
Each year a small number (approximately 20) hospitals are added to the AHA data set with
a designation indicating that they are not actually new or newly merged hospitals or are dropped
from the data set with a desgnation indicating that they have not actuaUy cIose or mergedwith
another hospital. In the former cases, it has been assumed that the hospital actually existed in
every year prior to its showing up on the data set and in the latter cases it hasbeen assumed that
the hospital actijaly existed in every year after it was removed from the data set. No data
(estimated or not) is avaUable from the AHA on such hospitals for years in which they
presumably existed but were not part of the data set. Similarty when a hospital appears on the
data set for the first time (whether or not it was actually a new hospital) the wage and
employment measures used in this study cannot be computed until the next year since a time
average is used to compute the employment figure. (For the same reason no 1979 data is used in
this study for any hospital (except to calculate the 1980 emp'oyment figure)). Rnally, wild
values for the wage and the ratio of nurses to inpatient days have caused some values to be set to
missing.
In order to impute a value when none is otherwise available, hospital specific means of the
logs of each of the four variables were computed. The deviation of all the hospital's values from
their means was then computed and, for each year and region, a mean of these deviations was
computed. For hospitals with missing data, values were imputed by adding the mean deviation for
the year and regn n question to the hospital's own mean computed using all the data available
on it.For a few hospitals, there was no data available for any year on the wage or the level of
employment. In the former case, the mean level of the log of the wage in that region and year was
the value imputed. In the latter case a mean for the hospitars og employment was imputed by
adding a constant to the mean of the log of its number of inpatient days. (The constant was the
mean of the log of the ratio of nurses to inpatient days for all hospita's and years.) The imputed
mean log emphyment level was then used to impute the empioyment levels for each year as
described above.
-21 -The total value of all imputations was a small fraction of the values in Table 1.in fact, no
value in Table 1 would change in the first two digits if no imputations were made. In a number of
cases, however, the mean or total va'ue for a particular region was significantly effected. Some
sensitivity ana'ysis indicates that the imputation process described above probably reduced the
estimates of the hospita' level inverse elasticity of supply by roughly 5%.
-22 -Notes.
See e.g. John Addison and William Siebert (1979) pp. 167-169 or Ronald Ehrenberg and
Robert Smith (1982) pp. 65-66. The only other example cited with any regularity in
intermediate microeconomics or labor economics textbooks is the market for professional
athletes.
2 Donald Yell (1975) notes that from the late 1930's to the time of his study reports of a
widespread shortage of registered nurses were almost continuous. Little has changed has
changed in this regard in the years since his study.
The American Hospital Association puts the argument from the point of view of the hospital
administrator: In its handbook, Surviving the Nursing Shortage: Strategies for
Recruitment and Retention of Hospital Nurses (1986), the association cautions, "[tjhe
third source of nurse employees --other hospitals and health care settings-.is
tempting but may be fraught with problems. Trying to lure nurses away from their
current employers with tempting salaries, bonuses, desirable hours, and so forth, often
sets up a climate for nurse wars in which the stakes lust keep getting higher and the
competition more cutthroat. Apart from creating ill will within the health care
community, such competition can put the control of the situation almost entirely in the
hands of the employees and destroy the conditions that contribute to a mutually satisfying
marketing exchange."
Under the urging of the hospital industry, the federal government has responded to the
nursing shortage by instituting a number of programs which have heavily subsidized the
cost of nursing education. Stephen Mennenmeyer and Gary Gaumer noted in 1983 that
$1.2 billion had been spent in the previous 17 years on subsidizing the education of
registered nurses. See Donald Yett (1975) and Richard Mckibbin (1982) for description
and analysis of some of these programs. On the other hand, James Robinson (1988) notes
that the reduction in these subsidies which occurred in 1978 was largely due to the
acceptance by policy makers of the monopsony hypothesis. The perceived shortage of
nurses has also led to a very liberal policy with respect to the immigration of nurses from
around the world. See, for example, Washington Times (July 11, 1988).
Of course, a finding of no monopsony power would not constitute proof that the low
earnings of nurses (relative to occupations judged comparable by researchers) is
attributable to a taste for discrimination. See Mark Killingsworth (1985) for a
discussion of the relevance of monopsony power to the comparable worth controversy.
-23Fourteen of the fifteen associations which responded to Yetts survey indicated that they
had such a program. The fifteenth requested information on how they might start one.
Eugene Devine (1969) offers some evidence for hospital collusion in the setting of wages.
See also Committee on Post Office and Civil Service (1983) for allegations of area wide
wage fixing arising out of Lemons vs. City and County of Denver, the well known
comparable worth case invoMng nurses.
7 Throughout this paper, the phrase monopsony power will be used in this sense rather than
as a description of a market in which there is literally one employer or one perfectly
coflusive carte' of empioyers.
Adarnanche and Sloan note that population density per square mile, a variable ncIuded in
their wage equation, but not in those of other studies, is high'y negatively correlated with
hospital concentration. While the argument for the nclusion of this variable in a model
which already controis for measures of the cost of living and alternative wage rates is not
particularly obvious, it points up a problem with all cross-section studies of wages and
concentration. That is, concentration is closely associated with the size of a city and thus
with many other variables which may be related to wages. Other related studies include
those of Frank Sloan and Richard Elnicki (1979) who find that starting salaries for
nurses and other workers are on'y weakly related to hospital market share in a 1973
cross-section of hospitals, Myron Fotter (1977) who finds that higher concentration is
associated with lower wages for non-professiona' hospitai empoyees in a cross-section of
SMSA's in the 1960s and early 1 970's, Brian Becker (1979) who finds that hosptaI
market share is not related to wages for non-professional hospital workers in a sample of
Hinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin hospitals in 1975 and Karen Davis (1973) who finds,
at the state evel, a positive association of hospitals per square mile with average wages
fer all hospita' workers only when variables measuring the presence of specialized
faciHties are excluded from the model.
The current approach s a'so closely related to that of David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller
(1987) who operationalize the geographic market definition exercise proposed in the
Justice Departments Merger Guidelines (1982) by estimating the demand &asticity
facing the collection of firms in progressively larger geographic areas.
10The assumption of cost minimization is not essential to any of the following anatysis. As
long as the hospital solves some kind of optimization problem subject to an upward sloping
supply function, there will be a gap between the wage and some notion of a marginal
product. For instance suppose that the hospital acts so as to maximize some function,
-24 -IJ(N, B, z) where N is again the level of employment, B is the wage bill, NW(N) and z is
some vector of exogenous variables. The first order condition for the firms maximization
problem is. in this case,
(UN / - U )- W
WN N/W :8
w
Here (UN / - UB ) takes the place of a marginal product, but the form of the relationship
is the same and 0 is still the parameter which describes market power.
AH three notions of equUibrium considered are completely static and assume perfect
certainty. Incorporating dynamics and uncertainty ntc the theoretcaI framework wouid
be a valuable extension.
12 See Jonathon Baker and Timothy Bresnahan (1988) for a more detailed discussion of the
consistent conjectures assumption.
The assumption that caseload is exogenous is standard in the large literature on the
estimation of hospital cost functions. See, for example, Thomas Grannemann, PandaH
Brown and Mark Pauly (1986) or Daniel Sherman (1988). Robert Conrad and Robert
Strauss (1983) are the most explicit in giving the argument that the demand for hospital
services is exogenous to the principal decisions of the hospital administrator.
Physicians, in their view, "operate as independent, demand creating entities.
14 The data is discussed more fully below.
15 ri the empirical work reported below, separate estimates are given forhospitals in major
metropcltan areas and those outside of such areas.In preliminary work, no detectable
dependence of the inverse elasticity on the census region or per-capita income was found.
Thus to estimate model (11) it is necessary to have d + 2 years of data.
17 is also worth noting that if (on)rjt was replaced with a set of region specific year
eftects when, in fact, mod& (11) was correct, the resulting estimates of the inverse
eIastcity would be inconsistent since (11) can be rewritten as
d"rit Sr+(8 —d rit + d Erit
where (sn)rtZjnrjt .Thus the region specific year eftects eftects would tend to
d'rt and the coefticient on d ritwould tend to 8 —
-25 -1 In the actual estimation to be described below, it was found that
(on')rtlog Z xit1rjt replaced (on)rjin (12). The advantage of the log of the sum
over the sum of the logs is that the former deals straightforwardly with changes in the
number of hospitals in the region due to openings, closings, mergers and demergers. The
variable (on)rjt may also give too much weight to smaller hospitals which frequently
experience large percentage changes n employment and caseload. Similar substitutions
were made for variables summarizing other hospitals wages and caseloads.
The figure 0.765 is the ratio of average LPN wages to average RN wages n the state of
Maryland in 1984. See Daniel Sullivan (1987).
20 That Ls, if the number of RN equivalents was ent at the date of the survey n year t and
entl at the date of the survey the previous year, then the employment measure used in
the subsequent analysis was
nt (ent — ent_l) / (log ent —logen_1) (orntent If entent_i.)
21 Specifically any hospital which, for a given year, had values more than two times the
inter-quartile range from the median of the log of the wage measure or the log of the ratio
of nurses to inpatient days was eliminated from the sample for that year. Its value for the
wild variab'e was also set to missing and then a value for it imputed as described below.
Note that this was done for all hospitals -- not just those which would otherwise have been
included in the estimation sample.
21 The Nursing Personnel Survey for 1983 was thus administered midway between the times
of the 1982 and 1983 Annual Surveys. Given the manner in which the employment and
wage variables of this study are calcu'ated from the Annual Survey, we should expect a
reasonable match between the data of the two surveys. Two more Nursing Personnel
Surveys were administered to the same sample of hospitals in July of 1984 and October of
1985.
23 Associate, Diploma and Baccalaureate programs generally require two, three and four
years of training respectively. Stephen Mennenmeyer and Gary Gaumer (1983) using
micro data on nursing wages smilar!y find very small premia for baccalaureate degrees
after controlling for a number of human capital variables and for some characteristics of
the employer and the job. Lavonne Booton and Julia Lane (1985) argue that the lack of a
wage premium for holders of a baccalaureate degree is explained by what they argue is the
-26 -oligopsonistic nature of the nursing market.
24 n a similar survey conducted in 1987, 76.2% of hospitals reported experiencing a
shortage. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1988).
25 As was done with the annua' survey data, hospitals for which the log wage or the og ratio
of nurses to inpatient days as reported on the nursing survey were more than two times
the inter-quartile rage from the median were eliminated from the sample used to compute
the correlations.
2 DetaUed examination of some of the larger discrepancies between the two wage measures
revealed that one ikey source of measurement error in the Annual Survey data was
misunderstanding on the part of hospitals about whose wages were to be included in the
category for RNs and LRNs. The instructions on the facing page of the survey state that
only full time emptoyees' wages should be included. However, this is not printed next to
the b'ank on the survey. A number of the larger discrepancies between the two measures
seem like'y to be due to the hospital also including part time employees wages in the figure
reported to the AHA. Indeed, the author initially made the same mistake in calculating the
wage measures used to produce the estimates in the first draft of this paper. On the other
hand, many other discrepancies could not so easily be explained.
21 Regressions of employment level and wage level discrepancies between the two surveys o
the levels of the caseload variables revealed no significant reatonship.
2 It would have been interesting to see how average levets of total experience in nursing (as
opposed to tenure on the current job) change with changes in caseload, but the Nursing
Personnel Survey did not ask that question.
29 In order to be used in the estimation, the hospita' has to be in the estimation sample for
both years.
° For the length of stay variable, the average over afi other hosptaIs was computed as total
inpatient days at all other hospitals divided by admissions at all other hospitals). Some of
the smaller HSAs were combined into larger regiona' groupings. Specifically the
following were combined: 14020 and 14030; 16010 and 16020:16040 and 16050;
21020 arid21040; 22020and 22030; 31010 and 32050; 32020 and 32030; 41030
and 41040; 41080 and 41090; 41070 and 41100; 43010 and 62030; 43040 and
43090; 44050 and 44060; 45040 and 45060; 53020 and 53020; 86030 and 86050;
86030 and 86040; 88010 and 88020; 93040 and 93070; 94010, 94020 and 94030.
With these modifications, hospitals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia are
-27 -divided under this classification scheme into 186 mutually exctusive and exhaustive
groups.
Specifically, denote the column vector of dependent variables (for the different years) for
the 1h hospital as y1the matrix of explanatory variables for the various years as X,
and the vector of residuals as e1.(Different hospitals will supply different numbers of
observations because they wili have different patterns of missing data. Thus the matñces
above will not have the same number of rows.) The standard errors are the analogues for
longitudinal data of those proposed by White (1980), namely the square roots of the
diagonal elements of the matrix[Z1x1'x11[Z1x1' e1e1X11 (Z1X1X11 .See, for
example, Gary Chamberlain (1984).
12 The standard errors for the instrumental variables estimation are also heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent. The expression for the standard errors is the same as in
note1 except that the matrix ><1now contains the fitted values from the first stage of
two stage least squares.
Janet Currie (1989) has recently presented estimates of equations similar to those of this
paper for a sample of entirely unionized school districts. She finds that the estimated
inverse elasticity is positive and statistically significant.
David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller (1987) actually estimate a dynamic model for the
demand function facing a group of firms in a given area, although they do not emphasize the
short run results. Their estimates impiy somewhat surprisingly that market power is
greater in the long run.
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31Table 1
Aggregate Nursing Employment, Average Annual Earnings,
Hospital Inpatient Days and Average Length of Stay:
AHA Hospita's, General Hospitals, Estimation Sample
Year Total L%L2 AverageL%Inpatient L% Length



























































In 1 000's. Sum over all AHA hospitals of full time RN's + 0.765 times fufl time LPNs. Includes
AHA estimates and imputations as described in the text.
2 100 times change in natural logarithms.
In 1 000's of 1985 dollars. Total payroll expense for full time RNs and LPNs pius proportionate
share of hospital benefits payments all divided by total employment.
In 1,000,000's. Includes A.H.A estimates and imputations as described in the text.
Total inpatient days divided by total admissions. Includes mputations as described in the text.Table 2
Descriptive Statistics:
A.H.A. Annual Surveyt
Variable Mean Standard Median Interguartile Sampl
Deviation Range Size
1963 Level of:
Inpatient Days2 52.37 55.66 33.77 64.16 2634
Length of Stay3 6.65 .81 6.56 2.30 2634
FutiTimeNurses4 149.64 179.26 91.18 155.45 2834
Full Time RN's 121.14 155.12 66.00 126.00 2834
Full Time LPN's 37.51 43.14 24.00 39.00 2634
Part Time RNs 51.30 66.36 24.00 63.00 2634
Part Time LPN's 14.59 20.53 7.00 17.00 2834
Average Annual 36.13 11.62 34.37 14.65 2834
RN Earnings5
L%L.(1 960—1 965) in:
Inpatient Days -24.92 25.31 -22.53 30.25 1647
Length of Stay -1.15 14.37 —1.50 15.48 1647
Full Time Nurses 5.05 29.27 4.34 33.70 1647
Average Annual 21.74 32.65 21.49 36.29 1647
RN Earnings
Notes:
1See text for sample selection criteria.
2In 1 000s.
Inpatient days divided by admissions.
Full time RNs + 0.765 times full time LPNs.
In 1 000s of 1985 dollars. Total payrol expense for full-time RNs and LPNs plus
proportionate share of hospital benefits payments all divided by full time nurses.
100 times change in natura' logarithms.Table 3
Descriptive Statistics:
Hospital Nursing Survey 19831
Variable Mean Standard Median Interquartile Sample
Deviation Range Size
Full Time Nurses2 153.47 160.26 66.24 165.65 393
Full Time RN's 120.92 156.02 64.00 131.50 393
Full Time LPN's 42.55 47.52 27.00 46.50 393
Part Time RN's 41.23 56.66 20.00 50.00 393
Part Time LPN's 15.44 22.57 7.00 17.00 393
Starting Wage3:
Associate Degree 6.33 0.99 6.30 1.24 407
Diploma Degree 6.35 0.99 6.30 1.26 404
Bachelors Degree 6.39 1.00 6.34 1.30 403
Expense per Manhour4 11.27 2.68 1 0.87 2.51 320
Recruttment Cost 666.06 1334.57 300.00 696.00 327
Orientation Cost 2004.52 1 765.56 1500.00 1500.00 356
Shortage5 (yes 1) 0.266 409
Temp Agency (yes 1) 0.212 410
Union7 (yes 1) 0.147 409
Strike' (yes 1) 0.025 405
Percentage3 with
Associate Degree 33.1 21.6 30.0 34.0 393
Diploma Degree 46.6 23.1 45.0 30.0 393
Bachelor Degree 19.0 15.4 16.0 16.0 393
Masters Degree 2.2 0 2.0 393
Average Years Educ1° 14.90 0.32 14.94 0.41 393
Percentage11 with
0—1 Years Tenure 16.4 12.1 14.0 15.0 396
1—2 Years Tenure 1 6.0 11.0 15.0 10.0 396
2—5 Years Tenure 27.1 13.6 25.5 15.0 396
> 5 Years Tenure 40.5 19.1 40.0 23.0 396
Tenure Index'2 2.73 0.77 2.71 0.97 396
Vacancy Ratio13 0.092 0.170 0.028 0.102 366
New Hire RatIo14 0.055 0.062 0.036 0.077 361
Separation Ratlo1 0.043 0.056 0.027 0.056 374
Temporary RatIo's 0.255 0.552 0.067 0.211 76Notes:
See text for sample selection criteria. Figures are for the week of April 11983 unless
otherwise indicated.
2Full time RN's + 0.765 times fufl time LPNs.
Hourly salary offered to newly licensed applicants with education shown. Not adjusted for
inflation.
Total payroll expense for registered nurses divided by manhours worked.
Question is whether hospital is experiencing an overall shortage of registered nurses.
Question is whether hospital uses registered nurses from temporary agencies.
Question is whether nurses are organized for the purposes of coflective bargaining.
aQuestion is whether there has been a work stoppage, slowdown, or other organized interuption
of regular work by fufi time RNs between April 1, 1982 and March 311983.
Percentage of full time RNs with the educational preparation shown.
10 Average calculated assuming Associate Degree = 14 years, Diploma Degree = 15 years,
Bachelors Degree16 years, Masters Degree = 18 years, and Doctoral Degree = 20 years.
Percentage of full time RN's with tenure on the current job as shown.
12 Weighted average of scores form bracketed responses: 0 for less than one year, 1for one to
two years, 2 for two to five years and 5 for five or more years.
3 Budgeted vacancies for futi time RN's dvded by full time RNs.
14 Newly hired fuU time RNs in the quarter Jan 1, 1983 to March 31, 1983 divided by full
time RN's.
Full time RN's terminated and/or voluntarily separated in the quarter Jan 1, 1983 to March
31 1983 divided by full time RN's.
IG Number of shifts fifled by RN's from temporary agencies divided by fuU time RN's. Samp'e
limited to hospitals reporting that they use temporary agencies.Table 4
Correlations of Employment and Wage Data From
1983 A.H.A. Annual Survey and Nursing Personnel Survey'
logemployment log wage log employment log wage





log employment 0.983 0.060 1.000
nursing survey (0.0001) (0.261)
log wage 0.397 0.288 0.416 1.000
nursing survey (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Notes:
1The sample size is 351. Numbers in parentheses are significance levels. See text for sample
selection criteria.
2 log full time nurses from 1983 A.H.A. Annual Survey of Hospitals.
log average annual nurse earnings from 1983 A.H.A. Annual Survey of Hospitals.
log full time nurses from 1983 Nursing Personnel Survey.
log hourly starting salary for newly licensed Baccelaureate RNs from 1983 Nursing
Personnel Survey.Table 5
Regression Models for Reporting Difterences Between 1983
A.H.A. Annual Survey and 1983 Nursing Personnel Survey:
Log Full Time Nursest
Independent
Variable




Mog ipd (83-81) 0.014 0.030
(0.091)(0132)
Llog los (83-51) O.056
(0.49)




Mcc ipd (83-82) 0.232 0.019 0.206 0.001
(0.150) (0.181)O.151)(0J82)
L1og los (83—82) 0.521 0.550
(0.285) (0.283)
1og pd (82-81) 0.048 0.01
(0.160) (0.174)




Mog los (e2-80) -0.105
(0.2 5)
Notes:
Dependent variable is Jog full time nurses (from 1983 A.H.A. Annual Survey) minus log full time
nurses (from 1983 Nursing Personnel Survey). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. See
text for sample selecUon criteria.
2 Change in natural logarithms of npatient days.
Change in natural logarithms of average length of stay.Table 6
Regression Models for Reporting Differences Between 1983
A.H.A. Annual Survey and 1983 Nursing Personnel Survey:







Mog ipd (83-81) -0.231 -0.141
(0.120)(0.132)
Mog los (83—81) —0.311
(0.196)




Mog pd (83-82) -0.302 -0.12 1 -0.307 -0.130
(0.143) (0.173)(0.1 4)(0.1 7)
Mog los (83-82) -0.2 1 —0.4g3
(0.272) (0.273)




Mog ipd (82-80) -0.086-0.04
(0.11)(0.127)
Mog los (82-80) -0.107
(0.207)
Notes:
1Dependent variable is log average annual earnings (from 1983 A.H.A. Annual Survey) minus log
RN starting wage for newly licensed baccalaureates (from 1983 Nursing Personnel Survey).
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. See text for sample selection criteria.
2 Change in natura' logarithms of inpatient days.
Change in natural logarithms of average length of stay.Table 7
Regression Models for 1983 to 1985 Change in Selected Variables
on Change in Log Caseload and Change in Log Length of Stay
Dependent slog ipd2(s.ei3 Mog los4 (s.e.)5
VariabIe
percent Tenure 4.027 (4.829)
1Year 3.196 (6.067) 1.974 (8.700)
percent Tenure 18.645 (4.422)
1- 2 Years 22.326 (5.543) -8.748 (7.848)
percent Tenure -6.163 (5.988)
2 - 5 Years 0.733 (7.488) -16.389 (1 0.738)
percent Tenure —1 6.562 (7.049)
> 5 Years -26.313 (8.797) 23.172 (12.615)
Tenure Index -0.765 (0.283)
-1.078 (0.354) 0.743 (0.507)
percent Associate —3.950 (6.434)
Degree 1 .080 (7.946) -12.71 0 (11.780)
percent Diploma 6.190 (6.926)
Degree 5.042 (8.570) 2.900 (1 2.705)
percent Bachelor — 1.268 (4.443)
Degree —5.221 (5.481) 9.986 (8.125)
Average Years —0.206 (0.1 21)
Education —0.333 (0.149) 0.320 (0.220)
Part Time Ratio -0.080 (0.215)
-0.136 (0.268) 0.140 (0.399)
Vacancy Ratio 0.156 (0.153)
0.351 (0.193) -0.467 (0.285)
New Hire Ratio 0.014 (0.056)
-0.011 (0.071) 0.060 (0.108)
Separatton Ratio —0.006 (0.044)
0.054 (0.054) -0.153 (0.083)
Notes:
1See text for sample selection criteria.
2Coefficient of change in log inpatient days (1983 to 1985).
Estimated standard error of coefficient of change in log inpatient days.
Coefficient of change in log of average length of stay (1983 to 1985).
Estimated standard error of coeftifient of change in log average length of stay.
See notes to Table 3 for variable definitions.Table 5
Cross—Sectional Regression Models for Log Wage and Log Employment
on Log Caseload and Log Length of Stay (1983)1
Iridepenent
Vri able
Log Employment2 Log Wage3























See text for sample selection criteña. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
2 Dependent variable is log of nurse employment in 1983.
Dependent variable is log of average annual earnings of nurses in 1983.
log of inpatient days in 1983.
log of average length of stay in 1983.
Root mean square error.
Number of observations.Tab'e 9
Reduced Form Mod&s for Change in Log Empbyment'
Independent 1Year 2Year 3Year




































































































See text for sample selection criteria. Models also include HSA specific dummy variables.
Standard errors in parentheses are consistent in the presence of arbitrary forms of
heteroscedastcity and serial correlation.
2 Dependent variable is change in the natural log of employment over the number of years indicated.
Change in log inpatient days over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in log length of stay over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in log of the sum of inpatient days for other hospitals in the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the column.
Change in log of the average length of stay for other hospita's in the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the column.
Root mean square error.
Number of observations.Table 10
Reduced Form Models for Change in Log Wage1
Independent 1Year 2Year 3Year
Variable Differences2 Differences2 Differences2
FULL SAMPLE


















































































Mog ipd 0.173 0.167
(0.028)(0.034)
Mog los 0.0 15
(0.047)
Mog oipd 0.143 0.136
(0.059)(0.093)




0.24 1 0.24 1
7451 7451Notes:
See text for sample selection criteria. Models also include HSA specific dummy variables.
Standard errors in parentheses are consistent in the presence of arbitrary forms of
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
2 Dependent variable is change in the natural log of the wage over the number of years indicated.
Change in log inpatient days over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in log length of stay over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in log of the sum of inpatient days for other hospitals in the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the column.
6 Change in log of the average length of stay for other hospitals in the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the column.
Root mean square error.
' Number of observations.Table 11
Inverse Supply: Employment Setting Equilibrium
Independent 1Year 2Year 3Year
Variable Differences2 Differences2 Differences2
FULL SAMPLE
LJog n3 O789 0.740 0.369 0.35 0.265 0.264
(0.13 1)(0.128) (0.078) (0.077) (0.066) (0.064)
Mog on4 0.068 0.092 0.555 0.545 0.56 0.556
(0.151)(0.146) (0.117) (0.116) (0.111) (0.1 0)
RMSE5 0.281 0.277 0.32 0.3 10 0.317 0.317
abs6 11,445 11,445 8250 8250 5669 5669
METROPLOLITAN AREA5
LJog n 0.767 0.746 0.316 0.331 0.255 0.270
(0206)(0.208) (0. 39) (0.142) (0.108) (0.091)
LJog on 0.195 0.211 0.602 0.478 0.578 0.443
(0.261) (0.254) (0.111) (0.190) (0.184) (0.202)
RMSE 0.262 0.261 0.285 0.286 0.294 0.296
Obs 3994 3994 2868 2868 1962 1962
NON-METROPOLITAN AREA5
LJog n 0.808 0744 0.380 0.346 0.251 0.241
(0.1 69)(o163) (0.093) (0.089) (0.082) (0.078)
LJog on 0.016 0.053 0.550 0.571 0.569 0.578
(0.188)(0.181) (0.143) (0.141) (0.133) (0.132)
RMSE 0.290 0.285 0.322 0.318 0.322 0.321
abs 7451 7451 5382 5382 3707 3707
Notes:
See text for samp'e selection criteria. Models also include HSA specific dummy variables.
Estimation is by instrumental variables. Columns 1, 3 and 5 uselog ipd andlog oipd as
instruments. Columns 2, 4 and 6 use these variables andlog los andlog olos. Standard
errors in parentheses are consistent in the presence of arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticily and
serial correlation.
2 Dependent variable is change in the log of the wage over the number of years indicated.
Change in log of employment over the number of years ndicated by the column.
Change inlog of total employment by other hospitals in the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the co'umn.
Root mean square error.
Number of observations.Table 12
Inverse Suppiy: Wage Setting Equilibrium I
Independent 1Year 2\'ear 3\'ear
Variable Differences2 Differences2 Differences2
FULL SAMPLE
Mogn3 0.765 0.71 1 0.352 0.326 0.257 0.261
(0.138)(0.129) (0.078) (0.076) (0.067) (0.064)
Mog ow4 0.110 0.236 0.771 0.616 0.944 0.927
(0.243)(0.225) (0.161) (0.157) (0.166) (0.163)
RMSE5 0.260 0.275 0.313 0.312 0.323 0.323
Obs6 11,445 11,445 6250 6250 5669 5669
METROPLOLITANAREAS
Mogn 0.749 0.742 0.3 17 0.307 0.254 0.265
(0.224)(0.226) (0.139) (0.129) (0.101) (0.096)
Mog ow 0.357 0.336 0.691 0.926 1.150 1.126
(0.473)(0.455) (0.197) (0.263) (0.424) (0.362)
RMSE 0.261 0.260 0.268 0.267 0.301 0.302
Obs 3994 3994 2666 2666 1962 1962
NON-METROPOLITANAREAS
Mogn 0.606 0.709 0.354 0.320 0.237 0.229
(0.175)(0.159) (0.096) (0.091) (0.084) (0.061)
Mog ow 0.025 0.167 0.743 0.795 0.910 0.914
(0.269)(0.261) (0.190) (0.165) (0.213) (0.211)
RMSE 0.290 0.262 0.323 0.320 0.326 0.326
Obs 7451 7451 5362 5362 3707 3707
Notes:
See text for sample selection criteria. Models also include HSA specific dummy variables.
Estimation is by instrumental variables. Columns 1, 3 and 5 uselog ipd andlog oipd as
nstruments. Columns 2, 4 and 6 use these variables andlog los andlog olos. Standard
errors in parentheses are consistent in the presence of arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.
2 Dependent variable is change in the log of the wage over the number of years indicated.
Change in log of employment over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in log of total employment by other hospitals n the HSA over the number of years
indicated by the column.
Root mean square error.
Number of observations.Table 13
Inverse Supply: Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium I
Independent 1Year 2Year 3Year
Variable Differences2 Differences2 Dfferences2
FULL SAMPLE
slog n3 0.791 0.737 0.374 0.352 0.261 0.266
(0.129)(0.126) (0.077) (0.076) (0.065) (0.063)
1ogotpd4 0.034 0.020 0.297 0.59 0.350 0.296
(0.077)(0.1 05) (0.062) (0.111) (0.061) (0.1 18)
logolos 0.082 0.320 0.034
(0.166) (0.195) (0.216)
RMSE6 0.281 0.277 0.312 0.310 0.318 0.3 7
Obs7 11,445 1 ,445 8250 8250 5669 5669
METROPLOLITANAREAS
logn 0.772 0.751 0.325 0.317 0.261 0.258
(0.204)(0.210) (0.134) (0.136) (0.106) (0.097)
iog olpd 0.105 0.146 0.343 0.120 0.350 0.016
(0.140)(0.204) (0.111) (0.209) (0.110) (0.281)
logalas -0.063 0.4 5 0.504
(0.293) (0.316) (0.405)
RMSE 0.262 0.261 0.285 0.284 0.295 0.294
Obs 3994 3994 2868 2668 1962 1962
NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS
log n 0.809 0.743 0.384 0.351 0.253 0.244
(0.165)(0.159) (0.092) (0.088) (0.082) (0.078)
log oipd 0.008 -0.003 0.287 0.197 0.309 0.433
(0.093) (0. 126) (0.074) (0. 32) (0.072) (0.142)
log 0105 0.088 0.237 -0.287
(0.208) (0.252) (0.286)
RN$E 0.290 0.285 0.322 0.318 0.322 0.321
Obs 7451 7451 5382 5382 3707 3707
Notes:
1See text for sample selection criteria. Models also include HSA specific dummy variables.
Estimation is by instrumental variables. Co'umns 1, 3 and 5 uselog ipd andlog oipd as
instruments. Co'umns 2, 4 and 6 use these variab'es andog los andog olos. Standard
errors in parentheses are consistent n the presence of arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and
serial corre'ation.2 Dependent variable is change in the log of the wage over the number of years indicated.
Change in log of employment over the number of years indicated by the column.
Change in logofthe sum of irpatient days for other hospitals in the HSA over the number of
years indicated by the column.
Change in log of the average length of stay of other hospitals in the HSA over the number of
years indicated by the column.
Root mean square error.
Number of observations.